Dear Saffa,
Thanks very much for the insights. Three issues:
1. In strategic thought and practice, what matters most is capability and not motive. Nobody trusts, or should trust, the junta. As you, Jimmy and a lot of others have pointed out, agreements mean nothing for the kinds of people that have committed mindless atrocities on fellow Sierra Leoneans. They are likely to renege on the agreement at the slightest opportunity. Only the threat and/or use of force will get them to behave properly.
But since an agreement is in place, we should be ready to give them the benefit of the doubt, and focus our attention on capabilities. The agreement does empower ECOMOG as the main organ for disarmament and for the maintenance of order during the transition period. The job of ECOMOG will be much easier if the junta cooperates in the disarmament programme. However, if for any reason the junta refuses to cooperate, ECOMOG should still press ahead with its deployment programme.
We should not allow a repeat of the mistake of the Abidjan Accord's disarmament programme when Foday Sankoh effectively blocked the deployment of 720 UN peacekeeping forces to help police the settlement. It will indeed be a tragedy if much time is wasted trying to secure the cooperation of the junta in the disarmament programme. The aim of the transition should be to improve the CAPABILITY of ECOMOG in the security field. Only an unambiguous display of such capability will enable ECOMOG to obtain compliance from the junta, carry out its duties, and improve the security of the country for ordinary Sierra Leoneans to live normal lives again.
And I absolutely agree with you that the border with Liberia needs to be secured. We all know that Charles Taylor's NPFL and the RUF have been allies. Recent statements by top Taylor officials demonstrate that Liberia can be a loose cannon within the ECOWAS group. The history or social background of the NPFL is similar to that of the RUF, and now the AFRC.
Agreements do not mean much to lumpen-oriented groups unless they are backed by an overwhelming display of capability -- or force. Democratisation is not likely to change the behaviour of Taylor for a considerable time. He is a militarist at heart, and is also unpredictable -- just like the people he armed, Sankoh's RUF, to destabilise Sierra Leone.
There are currently 10,000 ECOMOG troops in Liberia. Taylor knows that he cannot match the capability of the ECOMOG force in the country, despite his rhetoric about ending the mandate of the force. In addition, he still has to contend with the question of what other warlords like Alhaji Kromah, George Boley and Roosevelt Johnson would do if ECOMOG left. As it stands, Taylor is still beholden to Nigeria and ECOMOG for security in his country. Once ECOMOG starts deploying into Sierra Leone, it could use part of those 10,000 troops in Liberia to secure the border between the two countries. What Sierra Leoneans should do is to firm up the resolve of ECOMOG, particularly Nigeria, whose troops are already in the country, to act with dispatch. They already have a mandate to do this and should seize the opportunity immediately if the costs of managing the transition are to be reduced.
We should not worry much about stories which talk about what the junta plans to do. They are bound to be unhappy with the agreement anyway, and would do anything to increase their own capability and secure the best for themselves. The job of ECOMOG, Sierra Leoneans and the international community should be to ensure that the junta is made to face in very unclear terms a superior power each time it wants to renege on the agreement.
2. While ECOMOG and the Kabbah government focus on capability, they should also ensure that they honour what they have signed or agreed to. They should not be seen to act opportunistically. If the junta cooperates, it makes poor strategic sense to attempt to humiliate them. Their cooperation will make the job of disarmament easier, since they can help persuade their rank and file comrades in the AFRC and the RUF to report to the assembly points that will be designated for disarmament, and to give up their weapons.
3. You asked about the role of the UN. I understand that the UN is waiting to be briefed about the details of the agreement. What they are being asked to do is similar to the role they played in Liberia: provide technical and logistical support to ECOMOG, which is the principle peace-enforcement force in the agreement. The UN's participation of course needs the approval of the Security Council. I do not think that the UN is likely to turn down a request to send forces to Sierra Leone to support ECOMOG if both the junta and ECOWAS agree to honour the agreement. The council is unlikely to do so if one side is opposed.
I understand that Alieu Kamara, junta spokesman, prefers a UN force, and not an ECOMOG force, for disarmament. Such kinds of noises are likely to work against a deployment of UN troops.
Whatever the situation, Sierra Leoneans should insist on two things. First, ECOMOG's primary responsibility for disarmament should not be compromised. The simple reason is that ECOMOG is not just a peacekeeping force, but a peace-enforcement force. Unlike a UN peacekeeping force which the Security Council can withdraw when confronted with danger, the ECOMOG force is not likely to be removed if the junta refuses to cooperate and full scale fighting breaks out. A comparable organisation to ECOMOG is NATO, which is enforcing the peace deal in Bosnia. Second, if the UN does not send the anticipated force to Sierra Leone, ECOMOG should still press ahead to deploy its troops in the country. The only influence we have in the security field is in ECOMOG, not the UN. The UN should be encouraged to play the role that has been designed for it in the agreement. But we know that Africa does not control the Security Council; and Sierra Leone is not of strategic value to the countries that control the Council. We have seen UN peacekeeping forces withdrawn from several African countries -- such as Rwanda and Somalia -- for us to put our main eggs in a UN peacekeeping basket.
With best wishes,
Yusuf