Good insights on the constitutional issues relating to the transfer of power to Albert Margai upon the death of the prime minister, Milton Margai. Two issues:
1. There is no doubt that from the legal/constitutional point of view the Governor General did not err in appointing Albert Margai as the prime minister, if he was convinced that he, Albert, commanded the confidence of the majority of members in parliament. The Westminster parliamentary system of government, the basis on which our constitution was crafted, clearly supports the GG's actions.
Milton Margai could not choose his successor under such arrangements, unless if he was able to convince his fellow parliamentarians to accept his choice. Strictly speaking, parliament could undo his choice if the majority of members did not support it. If Albert Margai did not enjoy the confidence of his fellow parliamentarians, he could also have been deposed, or forced to call an election, by a simple majority vote after his assumption of power -- this is regardless of whether he has the backing of the GG.
This is why in stable Westminster-type parliamentary systems, GGs act only when they are confident that their choice is not likely to be challenged by the majority of parliamentarians. A rare contrary case is the sacking of Gough Whitlam, the prime minister of Australia, by the GG. But even in this case, the GG's action was successful only because he did not seek to replace Whitlam with a prime minister of his own choice, which Whitlam could have challenged and probably won in parliament. Instead, the GG called for fresh polls.
Even if a party's constitution calls for a deputy leader or some other individual to succeed as leader if an incumbent is dead or rendered invalid, such a person so designated can be denied the office of the PM if the majority of MPs are against him/her at the material time when he/she is to take over the reins of power. A vote of no confidence can be passed against him/her. His/her only weapon in such a case is to threaten to dissolve parliament and call elections, which MPs are always afraid of. Even in this case, the GG can reject his/her decision to hold fresh polls if the GG is convinced that someone else can win the confidence of the majority of MPs. Such a person can then demonstrate this by a vote of confidence in parliament.
The fact that Karefa-Smart did not challenge the GG's decision in parliament should indicate that he did not enjoy the confidence of the majority of the MPs and was unlikely to have won a confidence vote on the issue.
2. Was Albert Margai's appointment as PM the right decision from the point of view of national politics? This is where the eyes of the social scientist would pop up in reading stuff which suggest that legal arguments are enough to lay the issue to rest. There are so many unanswered questions, and the published works on the subject are not very helpful. A decision can be based on solid legal foundations, but be politically wrong or questionable.
What has not been explained is why Albert Margai was able to win the confidence of the majority of the members of the SLPP. Was he the most competent in the party, or the one with the most brilliant ideas about how the party and the society should be governed? Or was this choice made because of his ethnic affiliation and blood ties with the late prime minister? What was the distribution of power within the party? Who called the shots within the party and why? How nationally representative and democratic was the party? Given the way the party was structured and governed, was it possible to have a different outcome.
3. With the benefit of history, one can say that the decision to grant power to Albert looked very dumb politically. It destroyed the soul of the SLPP in the North and West of the country. It was the proof the APC, which was still trying to gain ascendancy in the North, wanted to show that the SLPP was a regional and nepotistic party. Perceptions are very important in politics. Whether or not the decision was based on ethnic/blood ties or other considerations, it was very difficult for those who remained in the party to convince people from other regions that the party would be open enough to allow for equal competition for the leadership. Some of the accusations against Albert by those who felt excluded then were that he was not the most senior member of the party, and that he had at one stage even left the party and formed his own, the PNP. Indeed, in the North, the SLPP was reduced essentially to a party of chiefs and their associates. It seems to have this image even today. It partly explains why the APC unleashed a ruthless agenda on chiefs -- deposing and making chiefs after its own reckless image and interests.
Karefa-Smart's actions ( including others of his generation across the country) would be more valuable to posterity than his current obstructionist, ego-driven politics, if he is to write his memoirs. We need to learn more about how political decisions of this type were taken, which changed the course of our politics.
With best wishes,
Yusuf