Dear Saffa,
Many thanks for the questions. It is an opportunity to address other issues that have also cropped up.
1. I use "we" to refer to those who have campaigned for the restoration of constitutional rule in our country, or resisted AFRC/RUF rule. We are all in it together, not just the legitimate government, ECOMOG, the OAU and the UN .
2. First of all, I think we should see the Conakry agreement as a political document. It is only a framework. What may come out at the end is not likely to be what the signatories may even have had in mind when they signed it. This applies to all the parties. And no transition from war to peace has been smooth anywhere. There are always surprises, attempts at cheating or sabotage, and setbacks— even failure. All parties will be working to maximise their interests in the transition.
3. In politics one should never be held captive to all the details of a preferred outcome. A one track approach in a volatile environment may make it difficult to respond to new challenges. One should pick on the most important issues that are likely to support one’s ultimate objective, and work on them. I think a major problem which some of our colleagues who have expressed misgivings about the agreement have is their adoption of a maximalist and legalistic position on the agreement: its either all or nothing; and it is now or never. This is not how societies and politics operate.
4. I think one should also recognise the fact that using a regional power to defend one’s interests is not like buying a pair of shoes or a car that one can rely on to do exactly what one wants at all times. Regional powers, like super powers, have interests which transcend the interests of any one country, including the country it is defending at any given time. The challenge is to ensure that the differences between the regional power and the country that is being defended are properly managed and minimised.
5. I think that the two most important issues in the agreement are the junta’s decision to cede power to the legitimate government and to allow ECOMOG to disarm its forces. Let me emphasise this point: Kabbah is not Kabila, or Museveni, or Kagame, or Meles. In other words, he does not have an army of his own that can protect him if he is to return to Sierra Leone today. What passes as the national army is one of our biggest problems: it is rotten from and to the core. His security is based on ECOMOG’s power—which is an international force. And ECOMOG cannot protect him without extending its power and authority in the country. In the circumstances, calls for his immediate restoration to power border on rhetoric.
6. What is urgently needed is for Kabbah’s government to stamp its authority on the agreement. It is a mistake not to have been on the ground when the agreement was being hammered out. I think that his criticism of the agreement’s time frame is not realistic. And he does not sound credible to reject amnesty on the grounds of his own personal misfortune. Right up to his General Assembly speech, which was a few days before the attack on Cockeril and the destruction of his house, he was staunchly opposed to state trials. He also signed the Abidjan Peace Accord, which gave amnesty to the RUF, which killed anything between 10,000 and 20,000 innocent Sierra Leoneans.
7. A meeting with the most important actors for the implementation of the peace plan is absolutely important: Malu, the ECOMOG commander; Maxwell Kogbe, the commander in Sierra Leone; and Godwin Ugbo, Director of Defence Information. A visit to Abuja and the other member countries that make up the Committee of Five is also a must. It will be a good idea if people who understand military issues are posted to Liberia, to work with Malu; to Abuja to interact with those who take decisions on Sierra Leone and ECOWAS; and to Lungi, to work closely with Ugbo and Kogbe. The worst thing that can happen is for ECOMOG to begin to see itself as a neutral actor in the maintenance of peace and security in the country. It is the responsibility of Kabbah’s government to ensure that it continues to enjoy the confidence of ECOMOG. In Liberia, ECOMOG coerced the warring factions and in the end became a neutral referee. In Sierra Leone, its mandate is to restore the legitimate government in power. The government should not take chances on this issue.
8. Now to the question of improving ECOMOG’s capacity, and the role of outside agencies. The agreement calls for the disarmament and demobilisation of all combatants by ECOMOG. Other African countries can be asked to supplement the Nigerian force that’s already in the country. This was done for Liberia. But we should never make the mistake of ending up with a force which is largely made up of countries that are not fully committed to the process. They are likely to pull out: even in Liberia, several African countries pulled out when the going got tough. Only Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea stayed the ground. Assistance from EC countries and the US was also very important in beefing up ECOMOG’s capacity in the field of logistics, or in transport and communications. This policy should be repeated in Sierra Leone if nation-wide deployment of ECOMOG troops should be effective. A UN presence, which does not have to be large ( although 50 looks small to me), should help to build confidence as the process unfolds.
9. The idea that the army should not be disarmed should of course be totally rejected. The army shot itself in the foot after its unpatriotic and violent anti-people acts in May 25 and after. Sierra Leone needs a new security system. Restoring the president in a context where the army is still intact is no solution to our problem: it only prepares the ground for another assault on the security and well-being of Sierra Leoneans. We have to face the fact that Sierra Leone is a failed state. We need an international force to help with the process of constructing the fundamentals of the country’s security. ECOMOG should provide basic security in the interim while a new military system is being worked. This could take a number of years. The government can help towards meeting the costs of such a force. Sierra Leone cannot afford to get its security system wrong this time.
With best wishes,
Yusuf