Julius, because of some pressing matters, I had deliberately postponed responding to your very interesting call to reform our society because I suspected that my response to your piece would be rather long. Hence, I needed time.
I agree with you that the RUF war was a mere symptom of a rather deep-seated social malaise that you seem to describe as irresponsible governance, meaning that because people have not cared enough to make their government serve them, the governors have served themselves. I, however, see the issue to go much farther: I see it as one of inappropriate governance. By "inappropriate governance," I mean a system of government that the majority of Sierra Leoneans do not understand. Hence, they do not even know how to respond to make the "governors" do their bidding.
For those of us who were raised in the rural areas of Sierra Leone, where most Sierra Leoneans live, government is seen as that alien structure out there in Freetown (with its tentacles stretched in the district and provincial headquarters) whose only role is to bring grief on innocent rural folk. Until the RUF appeared, most rural folks saw the government and its many tentacles as the enemy from whom one ran if one knew what was good for oneself. For instance, the appearance of a police constable in a typical village is generally reason enough to make an entire village take to the bushes because experience teaches them that when ever the Police appear in a village, everyone is likely to be beaten up mercilessly in order to coerce them to cooperate with some investigation.
From their perspective, therefore, it is quite rational (and life-preserving) if one let the government (an acronym for the educated elites) to do whatever they wished. As far as they are concerned, the government is for the "bookfolks".
While the war might have helped make the rural folk more interested in national political matters, I dare say that peacetime will bring back the master-servant relationship that has existed between government and the rural folk. Hence, one cannot really look to the latter to constitute the "civil society" you are talking about. They will return to their villages and continue worrying about coffee prices, the rice harvest, and what-have-you and leave the sort of matters you are raising here to the "bookfolk."
Thus, "civil society" (in the sense you are using the term) is going to be limited to the educated elites, who are by-and-large "the government." Those among them who scream about democracy, transparency in government, and all the cliches that would make the West congenial to their cause do so only when they are outside the corridors of power, which is a synonym for wealth. If they get into government, they become no different than the group they opposed. (That Hindolo Tyre, the erstwhile S.O.S, Information and Broadcasting in the NPRC regime, would be the one under whose watch Salone got the most restrictive press laws is the most recent evidence of this tendency.) The whole business is not about ideological differences or convictions; it’s about the quickest way to make money, about which side of the bread is buttered and how fast one can get there.
Because the "governors" are a sample that is generated from the small population of the "educated few" that would also constitute the core of "civil society" that would force government to do our bidding suggests to me that the leaders of the "civil society" might just be the next governors waiting in the wings. Hence, they may not be really interested in slaying the goose that lay the golden egg, in spite of the rhetoric. Therefore, if we are really interested in real reform, I suggest that we start thinking about reforming the governmental structure itself so that it is replaced by one which is understood and supported (not feared) by the majority of our compatriots. I suggest that we start thinking seriously about decentralizing the powers of the central government and strengthening the powers of local government. By local government, I mean the district councils and the chiefdom administrations. I am thinking about a Salone version of the governmental system in Switzerland, which has rather strong local (canton) governments and a very weak central government.
Rightnow, I am thinking about a constitutional arrangement that would delegate the powers of taxation and public expenditures on roads, primary and secondary education, arterial road building and maintenance, among others, should rest with the local authorities. The central government would be left with international affairs, defense (under a two-tiered defense structure) and the administration of justice. One of the major advantages of such a reform is that it would make government relevant to the lives of the majority of Sierra Leoneans. People will naturally care about their government when they understand it and when it is close to them. Because local government would impact their daily lives much more than the central government would under such a system, rural people would be very much involved in local politics, making sure that the fruits of their taxes are well spent. We already see this in the amount of time and energy people put into paramount chief elections, and how the chiefdom people can be galvanized rather quickly into petitioning for the removal of an unpopular chief. (We know from history that when the district councils were responsible for road maintenance and primary school education, the results were much better than when everything became centralized.) Secondly, the weakening of the central government would make it less attractive for charlatans and snake-oil sales people who now masquerade as politicians to make it in politics since their actions would now be under more scrutiny at the local level. Hence, there would be less of an incentive to have what Yusuf referred to once as urban folks victimizing rural folks through political violence.
I also disagree with you rather slightly on the issue of national defense. I believe that if Salone goes to war in the near future, it would be an RUF-type war. We know from the American experience in Vietnam that even the best equipped, conventionally-trained army in the war could not win against a rag-tag militia of guerilla fighters. Most recently, the American military’s inability to arrest the late General Aidid in Mogadishu underscores the fact that conventional armies are only suited for conventional wars. Also, the success of the kamajors against the RUF should suggest to us that local militias under a central command (within a two-tiered defense structure) is our best defense against another misguided murderous rage by future Sankoh "wannabees". The militias have the advantage of knowing their turf much better than any invading rebel army. Hence, they would serve as the first defensive option should people decide to wage another mindless war against innocent rural folk.
Another reason for the constitution of such militias is that as reserve forces, they would be much cheaper to maintain than a regular army. (I am thinking about a Salone version of the military reserves in the US system. The reserves would train with the regular armed forces, but are employed in the civilian sector and activated only in times of trouble.) When peace arrives, it is inevitable that the current size of the Salone army cannot be maintained given our resource base. What our military strategists should be thinking about now is to "downsize" the RSLMF into a small but effective rapid deployment force that would be sent to areas of disturbances that are too serious for a local militia to handle. Sorry for the long response.