Sourie and Jimmy:
Granted, the language might imply a handing over prior to April 22, 1998. That is not my thrust. I mentioned in my posting that "I will dance with joy....." The basis for my statement is that the early date referred to has a direct link with the operations of the CDF. The "early" exit will be achieved via the victory of the CDF. Even though this might very well be desirable, there are serious consequences. And it is precisely the issue of "consequences" coupled with long term considerations that motivated my initial posting. This brings me to Jimmy's input in this affair. We seem to have a fundamental difference in perception and understanding of the genesis of the CDF.
The CDF is presumably an amalgam of the Kamajors, Kapras, etc. They are not a militia as we had discussed a couple of years ago. A militia is an entirely different military structure. I am sure we do not disagree on the fact that the CDF is a recent creation, with its nativity directly related to the present circumstances in our nation. My concern about Mr. Kabba's open support of the CDF is that he is tying his hands. He is obligating himself. Mr. Kabba is a human being and susceptible to expressions and actions of appreciation through rewards if he is reinstated via the victory of the CDF. Perhaps the reward is already apparent, if the CDF is seen as the national army or the only military organization that can do the job: defending the constitution. I obviously do not recognise the CDF as a national army and clearly have my doubts about creating the impression that they may eventually become the national army after Mr. Kabba is restored.
My argument, therefore, is directed at raising a basic question in terms of the vision of the military institution in Sierra Leone after the restoration of Mr. Kabba. Jimmy claims that the Conaky Accord is dead. It is not an unusual practice for accords to go through some forms of metamorphosis particulrly on issues surrounding the eventual legitimacy of certain institutions, notably the military, and aspects relating to thorny issues such as amesties and the like. It is precisely becuase of the built in constraints that Accords carry that parties that craft and append their signatures to such documents need to be on the alert when they dot the "i"s and cross the "ts." We know that both sides have vacillated on this agreement. If the agreement is declared "dead," it behooves the president to make such a declaration rather than having to place himself in a situation the same of which characterises the junta.
I will have no problem if Mr. Kabba makes an explicit statement that he has abandoned the peace process and now openly commited to removing the junta by force. That at least will indicate in clear terms where he stands, and based on that we can begin to look seriously into the long term effects of that decision; his position within the international and regional contexts, and most importantly, the impact on our national interests.
I wish to reiterate that I am not against the Kamajors, Kapras and other ethnic/traditional groups of that nature. I respect and support their ethnic mandates as far as I understand them: eseentially to defend the interests of their group. Such mandates are defensive in nature rather than offensive. What we have clearly in this case is an amalgam that has ascribed unto itself an offensive mandate, and now, with a presidential stamp of approval. I still believe this is dangerous and in the LONG RUN/TERM counter-productive.
The junta must go, and will go. The gallant people of Sierra Leone through various forms of resistance have demonstrated a resolve which frankly sets a precedent (this may be an exageration) in our continent. Within the structure of this resistance, I include the actions of the Kamajors in particular who have single-handedly defended their traditional areas with strength and determination as manifested in the routing of the RUF from areas traditionally defended by the Kamajors. When it comes to a national offensive drive, I have very strong reservations about the expediency of this action. This, my dear brothers is my concern, and continue to treat it as you have: as genuine on my part. Please excuse typos.
Fraternally,
Cecil