Dear Cecil,
Thanks for expressing your comments on the current state of the Conakry Accord. Your concerns are very genuine, and I know that you are not the only Sierra Leonean holding them. War, whether just or unjust, always generates costs and unforseen consequences. It is an option that one should always treat with much seriousness. May I, however, underscore the following points, some of which I think your posting seems to have ignored or underplayed:
1. The Conakry Accord is meant to provide an orderly mechanism for the termination of the illegal seizure of power by the AFRC junta. Unlike the Abidjan Accord, which treats the RUF as a legitimate party in the conflict, the Conakry Accord does not grant any legal status to the AFRC regime. Indeed, the decision to reaffirm the relevance of the embargo during the transition period underscores this point very well. Surely, the Accord grants the junta immunity and incentives for their disarmament and reintegration into society. The junta is not expected, however, to dictate the terms of the implementation of the Accord. It is very clear that ECOMOG, assisted by the UN, should disarm and mobilise the junta's forces -- referred to in the Accord as combatants. ECOMOG troops are supposed to be deployed throughout the country to facilitate the process of disarmament and demobilisation. And the junta is obliged by the accord to cooperate fully with ECOMOG in the enforcement of the transition programme.
2. Indeed, given the fact that the Conakry Accord recognises the continued relevance of the Abidjan Accord, it is only the RUF -- not the army -- that enjoys some political recognition, but only after the reinstatement of the Kabbah government. The Abidjan Accord was signed between a legitimate government and a rebel movement. That's why ECOMOG has insisted that Foday Sankoh can only be released from detention to "play an active role in the peace process" after the reinstatement of the legitimate government.
3. It is absolutely clear as other Netters have noted that it is the junta that has reneged on its obligations under the Accord. It has raised one spurious reason after another just to frustrate the work of ECOMOG. President Kabbah's Press Release of 13 January on the Conkary Peace Plan provides a detailed account of the obstacles that the junta has set up to derail the Accord. The disarmament programme, which is supposed to have started on December 1, has achieved nothing. From all indications, the junta is not interested in honouring what it has signed.
4. The message it is giving to ECOMOG and the international community is that it is not ready to assist in the orderly transfer of power and will have to be removed by force of arms.
5. My own position since the Accord was signed has been that ECOMOG should deploy its troops massively into the country even if the junta refuses to accept an orderly exit from power. In the first instance, the junta is illegal, and the Accord provides a strong basis for the deployment of ECOMOG troops in the country. I also very strongly believe that the type of junta that we are dealing with makes it impossible to rely on negotiations alone to return the country to constitutional rule. The stick will have to be used as an integral part of the process of getting them to honour the provisions of the Accord. Malu's statements a day or so after his replacement was announced, in which he hinted at a possible deployment of an additional 10,000 troops into the country, with or without the junta's approval, was the kind of action I have been expecting all along if we really want to end the stalemate. I do not see how the junta can withstand a full scale deployment of troops of that magnitude. It will then be coerced into agreeing to the implementation of the disarmament programme without conditions. One has to stress the key point in President Kabbah's January 13 Press Release: the junta is illegal, and should not be allowed to dictate terms. It should be made to feel illegal.
6. I will not go as far as to say that the Accord is dead. Accords don't die easy deaths. They get derailed, which is what the junta has done to the Conakry Accord. But the date of 22 April provides a strong psychological advantage to the Kabbah government. The Accord also makes it possible to reduce the costs of disarmament and demobilisation if the junta is eventually overwhelmed in the field. From his January 13 press release, I think that Kabbah is fully aware of the continued political relevance of the Accord.
7. Is Kabbah right to mobilise the CDF? Is the CDF an ethnic army? And what are the implications of relying on the CDF in coercing the junta out of power?
Again, as others have stated, I really do not see why the mobilisation of the CDF represents a violation of the Accord. First of all, the CDF was already a factor in the struggle to reclaim the government from the junta before the Accord was signed. It is not a post-Accord creation. It is the intransigence of the junta that has led to the intensification of CDF activities. One understands from the statements of the CDF, that they will stop fighting if the junta agrees to cooperate with ECOMOG. I really do not see what Kabbah could have done after it had become very clear to all that the junta would not move an inch if it was not coerced into doing so. I think it is a very realistic strategic policy to have a home grown defence force as part of ECOMOG's attempts to deliver peace in the country -- especially given the well known regional and international constraints to the full deployment of ECOMOG in the country. Such a home grown force, in fact, compliments the work of ECOMOG. I will only question the CDF if 1) it decides to work outside the logic and framework of ECOMOG's operations and goals as they are curently known; and 2) if it splits into rival armed groups. It is the responsibility of Kabbah as the elected president of the country to ensure that these do not happen.
Is the CDF an ethnic army? Again, answers have already been given by others. Let me just say this. The CDF is obviously an outgrowth of the Kamajoi militia, with strong roots in Mende warrior traditions, and whose members were recruited largely from the South and East. PK's pioneering piece on the militia in the current edition of *Africa Development* throws much light on its origins, membership and character. There is now incontrovertible evidence that the national army was part of the problem in the six years of RUF terrorism in the rural areas. The Kamajoi militia emerged as a response to the army's collaboration with the RUF in brutalising the countryside. The story of the Kamajoi is, in fact, a remarkable case of ordinary people organsing themselves in self defence, when the state itself has abdicated its primary responsibilities to its citizens. Like all militias that emerge in chaotic conditions, the potential for abuse is there --either to settle local scores, or to protect vested interests at the national level. There were stories of even Lebanese buisnessmen joining or sponsoring Kamajoi militia in their local areas before the coup. It is also well known that the Kamajoi militia played a key role in ensuring the victory of the SLPP in the elections. The partisan character of the *kamajoi* is not in doubt. But this has to be understood from the point of view of a collapsed state and acute insecurity in the areas that were hardest hit by the war.
I fully supported the role of the kamajoi in routing the RUF in the war zones, which, as is well known, contributed a lot to the signing of the Abidjan Accord. I would have expressed the kinds of fears that you have raised if it is the *kamajoi* alone that Kabbah has turned to as a complimentary defence force in the search for a solution to the May 25 coup. My position, since the coup, has been to argue for the transformation of the kamajoi into a national defence force, with inputs from the entire country, inlcuding in the Western Area. From the little one knows -- none of us is on the ground -- the CDF is now a national civil defence force. The traditional names -- kamajoi, Kapra, Tamaboro, Donsa -- may give the impression that these are the traditional ethnic-based hunter guilds of yesteryears. As PK shows in his study, even in the case of the kamajoi, this view is way off target. There has been recruitment of a variety of individuals with no traditional claims to, or association with, the traditional guilds. One undertstands that there are even students in the CDF.
Given the unique nature of this experiment in popular resistance, I would encourage you to continue to raise the concerns that you have expressed about the possible misuse of the force for other purposes, or its degeneration into multiple armed groups. It is only by asking and debating questions like these, as well as criticising observed practices on the ground that the country can ensure that the CDF remains, or is further upgraded into, a truly national and disciplined defence force.
Finally, I think that the post-coup defence system is still open for debate. Even if the CDF routs the AFRC, the government will still need the cooperation of ECOMOG, which is already in the country, to guarantee full security, disarmament and demobilisation. There are just too many arms floating around in the wrong hands.
With best wishes,
Yusuf