Netters, as we think about proposals for a reform of our failed national security apparatus in SaLone, we should keep history at the back of our minds. I have been intrigued by the talk of a decentralized military arrangement for SaLone as a borrowed concept. In fact, prior to the Protectorate Proclamation, each chiefdom had its own military, which was autonomous. We know the problems we had with this arrangement as "warrior chiefs" (like Kai Londo of Luawa, Jigba of Tinkonko, Kabba Sei of Mobai, and others) started attacking weaker chiefdoms. This made what was known then as Interior very unstable for commerce. The Krio merchants from what was known as Sierra Leone then (the Colony) put pressure on the colonial government to annex the interior.
When Cardew offered the Chiefs the option of British "protection", the weaker chiefs were the first to realize the political benefits of the proposed arrangement. Soon, the "warrior chiefs" followed suit, and the Protectorate was declared on the principle that the Crown would be the military protector of the Protectorate. This obviated the need for each chiefdom to have its own military and the "war boys" were disbanded. From this perspective, it is apparent that the concept of chiefdoms having militias is indigenous to the territory we call Sierra Leone today. What is foreign is the concept of a centralized military.
The rebel war has shown us that the centralized military worked only when the "country's eyes were closed" (as my mother often describes that period). Then, the British Frontiers Police Force (the Kpama Gbois, as they were known in Mende Country because of the red stripe on each side of their khaki shorts) had a comparative advantage in violence. Today, with access to AK47s being much easier than access to rice, "the country's eyes are open." The security arrangement that the PCs made with the Crown has been found wanting, as the government in Freetown has been able to protect only the former Colony, not the former "Protectorate." Because of this apparent breach of faith, it is only sensible that the people of Sierra Leone revisit this issue.
It will be foolish for one to wish a return to the old days of the "warrior chiefs" and complete military autonomy at the chiefdom level. But it is equally foolish to assume that the people whose lives have been so rudely upset by the failure of the government in Freetown to perform its part of the "social contract" are going to trust their safety to an arrangement that has failed them so disastrously. Hence, a pragmatic solution, which places primary responsibility for maintaining law and order in each chiefdom on its local authorities is now overdue. This does not mean that the RSLMF should be disbanded. (This would take us back to the bad old days of the "warrior chiefs".) On the contrary, the RSLMF should be reformed into a rapid deployment force that could be brought in to help the local militia in security situations that threaten our national security. It (the RSLMF) would therefore be the force of last resort.
To reject such an idea on the lame and errorneous excuse that it is a borrowed model misses the point. (It is not!!! It is a modified version of a model that we rejected about 100 years ago.) Besides, I am not particularly concerned about borrowing ideas that work. We have not rejected modern technology because it is based on borrowed ideas. Why should we reject an idea that might be more important to our nation's very survival just because we errorneously label it as borrowed? Finally, since Jeff had raised the issue of Bosnia, we should never forget that if the world community had not imposed an arms embargo on the Bosnian moslems, but had instead allowed them to defend themselves, the tragedy of Bosnia would never have come to pass. Likewise, had the extant arrangement not prevented the people of the provinces from defending themselves, the tragedy we are witnessing today (which is approaching genocidal proportions) would have been mostly averted. This must never be allowed to happen again!!!
Take care, everyone.
Kelfala M. Kallon