Jeff writes:
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>Kelfala argues that localities in Sierra Leone should similarly be given responsibility for local order.
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>But won't that simply lead to a Bosnia-type situation? Won't each chiefdom, once it is armed, attempt to >form its own government? How will Freetown maintain its control? Won't this simply lead to anarchy?
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No Jeff, each chiefdom arming itself would not necessarily lead to a Bosnia-type situation. What I am talking about is a SaLone version of the US National Guard structure wherein each state has its own national guard that can be activated by its Chief Executive (the Governor). This does not mean that the RSLMF would or should be disbanded. Like the US federal army which are brought into the fray when disturbances are too much for a state's national guard to handle alone, I envisage an RSLMF that would be reformed into a rapid deployment force, perhaps with a batallion in each provincial headquarter. They should be able to control any chiefdom militia that threatens the public peace.
While the chiefdom militia can be activated by the Paramount Chief in whose chiefdom the disturbance occured, there shall be strong central control. In my opinion, given our poor logistical environment, each PC who activates a chiefdom militia should get permission from the central government, through the Provincial Secretary, within 48 hours in order for the activation to continue. The Provincial Secretary shall, on the advice of the President, despatch appropraite RSLMF forces to any chiefdom to disband its militia if a PC disobeys a central government directive.
Remember, Jeff, that in the 1960s, when Governor George Wallace tried to use the Alabama National to defy the laws of the United States in the Meredith affair, the Kennedy administration simply federalized the Alabama National Guard. So, I'll admit that there is the possiblity for a PC to try to defy the central government, but the RSLMF would still have the comparative advantage in violence, as the federal forces have relative to each state's National Guard.
We should also remember that Nixon at least reportedly considered asking the Joint Chiefs of staff to intervene on his behalf to save his presidency (as Siaki asked the ISU to save his on numerous occasions). Henry Kissinger reportedly informed Nixon that he would fail because the US army would have to fight 50 different state "armies" in order to prevail. (This was when Nixon asked Kissinger to join him in an appeal to an almighty power--God--in their famous prayer pose in the White House.) Thus, if managed properly, the Chiefdom militias would prevent would-be dictators (and we have them aplenty) from using their monopoly over the coercive powers of the state to force themselves on the people of Sierra Leone. Also, as it happened in the Nixon scenario, the militias would deter future military coups in Sierra Leone.
Finally, we have to face the fact that the nature of the wars we are likely to fight in the future (depending on how we dispose of this one) is likely to call for a very radical change in our military preparedness. Because I come from Kenema District, I'll give you the following example. Let's assume that the PC of Faama Chiefdom had a militia at his disposal when the RUF attacked Nomo Faama. They would have immediately met an organized resistance from that chiefdom's militia. The PCs of the neighboring chiefdoms (Tunkia, Koya, Gaura, Dama, and Nongowa) would have immediately made necessary arrangements to fortify their respective chiefdom's border. Had the RUF overmuscled the Nomo militia because of the former's sheer strength or the element of surprise, they would have had to fight in order to acquire every square inch of territory beyond Faama. This would have slowed them down considerably so that a contigent of the RSLMF that would have been dispatched from the Eastern Battalion would have had an easier time routing the invaders. Contrast this scenario with what happened on the ground when the RUF danced over vast territories in Pujehun, Kenema, and Kailahun districts in a matter of days and the wisdom of the militia suggestion would be immediately recognized.
Finally, with the reported proliferation of guns in the country and the utter failure of the central government to fulfill its mandate under the Protectorate Treaty, it would be naive to expect that the people of the provinces are going trust their lives to a centralized RSLMF in the future. Given this stark reality, it would be better for the central authorities to have a defense structure that they can control. The alternative might be even more Bosnia-like.
May 1996 lead us to peace.
Kelfala M. Kallon