Date: Tuesday, 02-Jan-96 04:07 PM
From: Kelfala M. Kallon \ Internet: (kmkallo@bentley.univnorthco.edu)
Subject: Re: Defense


Imam, under normal conditions, I'll agree with your reservations. But these are abnormal times. Also, given the "terrain (old growth forest, farm bush, and the extensive drainage system)" which you lucidly cite as posing "a major problem to maintaining any form of security" in Sierra Leone, would it not be better to give people who know that terrain well and are trained to defend it the primary responsibilty for defending it?

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You also ask:

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>In addition to not knowing the weapons capability of the so-called bandits, the poor civilians would >have no idea what numbers they may be dealing with. How many "sorsor-be-pee" guns are equivalent to >one AK 47?

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The Kamajois were armed with AK47s by the NPRC. And they fought as far away from Kenema as Joru. I am talking about allocating some of the resources that we are currently misusing on the RSLMF to arm the local chiefdom police forces appropriately. Remember that the Kamajois were only disarmed after they clashed with SOBELS who were caught carting their loot in army trucks to Kenema at night. (I was told by a friend who visited Sierra Leone during those heady days that the military successes of the Kamajois were a regular feature of the national news on the SLBS.)

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>Can 40 Kamjoi defend all of Small Bo Chiefdom for e.g., on foot and with no form of "intelligence" network?

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P.K. Muana's lucid analysis of RUF tactics on this Net and every report I have received about the RUF tells me that they attack in small bands, on foot. Also, the RSLMF relied on the intelligence capabilities of the Kamajois to such an extent that they were used as the advance team in most battles. I have seen an amateur video made by the Eastern Regional Defence Committee in which the Kamajois talk about riding bicycles in advance of the army, locate the enemy, and then ride back to inform the RSLMF command, which usually stayed in town.

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>What will happen to our numerous small (less than 10 homes) settlement to which some of can trace our >roots?

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We know what has happened to them under the current defense arrangemnt.

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>We should also not forget that the Kamajoi are most often among the strongest and most efficient >farmers....who will feed them if they take up defense?

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That people become part of a reserve force does not imply that they will abandon their regular jobs. We know who is not feeding them now under the current defense arrangement--they are starving to death. Had the chiefdoms had the capacity to defend themselves, most of those in the refugee camps would have been back to their chiefdoms, if not to their "less than 10 homes" communities).

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>Frankly, I just don't see why a national army cannot perform the job for which it was destined in the first >place.

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Neither do I, Bakarr. But, the fact is that they have not. On the contrary, they have been part of the problem. For example, in a recent telephone conversation with a resident of Kenema, I thanked God for the peace they enjoyed this holiday season. He responded that I should thank the people of Kenema who had the foresight to bribe the army in Kenema to give them peace this holiday season. The people had determined that much of the disturbances around Kenema had the duplicitous fingerprints of the army. Determined prevent last year's Christmas debacle by being proactive, they bribed the army to do its job. (Remember, the civil militia had been disbanded and people must now rely on the RSLMF for their protection.)

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>If a locally mandated civil defense should work, then why not eliminate the army (because it probably >won't prevent an invasion anyway) and channel the funds into supporting the former?

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I think that the army should be reformed into the force of last resort, which would complement the Chiefdom militia in the event of future disturbances that the latter cannot handle by itself. It should also maintain its comparative advantage in violence over individual militias in order to maintain central control over recalcitrant paramount chiefs.

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>Let us hope and pray that 1996 will give peace a chance.

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Amen. I also pray that you get drier and warmer weather in Miami.

Take care, and may God bless our land!!!

Kelfala M. Kallon


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